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1. Introduction
Social security especially in its forms such as pension and health insurance, is 
currently characterized by a financial imbalance of government obligations with 
financial revenues: insurance premiums, social taxes. This imbalance is 
characteristic of almost all countries with social insurance systems. In 2016, the 
twenty largest OECD countries together had 78 trillion. US dollars deficit in 
underfunding of solid-state (pay-as-you-go) and funded (defined benefits) state 
pension obligations, which is equivalent to about twice the collective national debt 
of these countries. The under reservation of private pension obligations is also 
insufficient, for example, private pensions in the United States are provided with 
only 82 percent of the reserves necessary for pension funds to fulfill their 
obligations, the deficit is about 3 trillion. US dollars. It is predicted that the 
average share of pension expenses in the GDP of countries in the world will grow, 
according to expert estimates, from 9.5% in 2016 to 12% in 2050 (City bank 
2016). Health expenditures also show a significant upward trend, as the 
corresponding expenditures in OECD countries grew by 3.4% in 2016, which was 
the largest increase since the post-crisis 2009. At the same time, the share of health 
expenditures is also quite high with an average value of 8.9% of GDP for OECD 
countries in 2016, and from 17.2% of US GDP to almost 6% of GDP in Turkey 
and Mexico (OECD Health Statistics 2018). 
Taking into account the demographic trend of aging and strengthening of 
digitalization on employment, it is obvious that this situation will continue in the 
future. One of the reserves for balancing the obligations of social insurance funds 
and reducing administrative costs is the improvement through the integration of 
administrative structures, the creation of unified centers for the provision of social 
services, and the widespread use of electronic forms of their provision. Criticism 
of the concept of social insurance, its lack of effectiveness in recent years is not 
always caused by global demographic problems or financial crises. In many 
respects, the inefficiency of social insurance is determined by the inefficiency of 
its management, while ‘in debates on social insurance reforms, the inability to 
distinguish between management and conceptual issues often criticizes the 
principles of social insurance, when the main focus should be on weaknesses in 
the ways of administering such a system’ (Gillion et al. 2001). On the whole, one 
of the main claims to increasing state social expenditures lies not in their size, but 
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in the requirements (requests of society, citizens) of the absence of losses, i.e. the 
effectiveness of their distribution, targeting, testing the need for social benefits. 
Losses as a result of this targeted redistribution should be minimized or generally 
eliminated as the consequences of the so-called ‘leaky bucket’, when a significant 
redistribution of resources is accompanied by uncontrolled ‘leaks’ (Okun 1975; 
Korpi 1985, 1996; Padovano and Turati 2012; Saltkjel 2017). The impact on the 
country's economy and its growth depends on the size of its social sphere, i.e. the 
larger the social system, the greater the impact it has. However, the vector of this 
influence depends on the effectiveness of the social sphere, its redistribution 
profile and administration (Cichon et al. 2004). 
According to a number of estimates, unproductive administrative costs in the 
redistribution of social resources, for example, in the health sector, can reach 
almost 8% of all expenses in this social sphere, while the total pressure of 
administrative expenses is more than 30% of all expenses, of which a significant 
part is accounted for by private providers (Evans 2013). However, the loss of 
accumulated social insurance resources when they are redistributed between 
generations, income strata, and other categories of recipients of insurance 
payments, in our opinion, is not so much in increased administrative costs (which 
in state social insurance are usually from 1 to 4.5%), how much is the organization 
of the mechanism of social insurance itself, its compactness, economy, and 
efficiency (Stefan 2015). At the same time, administrative costs are always  
a potential source of inefficiency in the productive reallocation of resources 
(Cichon et al. 2004).  
In this paper, we consider approaches, trends and expenditures in social security 
administration (SSA), mainly using the countries of the European Union. The 
potential of SSA in the current context are largely underestimated. We focus on 
the institutions and approaches in SSA, the comparative evaluation of expenditures 
and administrative costs of SSA in the EU countries, and related issues and 
challenges of SSA based on the comparison of different approaches. Drawing on 
this context, we define research questions as: What are the leading institutions and 
approaches in SSA?  Whether and in what a reserve of SSA is present for social 
security sustainability? We use an analytic approach, data and assumptions about 
how SSA potential is influencing social security sustainability.  
2. Assessment of indicators of the SSA in the EU area
The widespread increase in the social security expenditures is associated with 
general issues of the current state of society and economy: demographic and 
technological. Most of these changes lead to a transformation of the traditional 
employment model with the participation of the state, corporations and employers 
in these expenditures. The increase in the pension burden, health care expenditures 
and the growth of informal employment with the wide participation of non-state 
social service providers lead to a subsequent in government spending on social 
security, which increased by about 18% over the past 9 years, from 2008 to 2017 
using the example of the EU countries (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Changes in social security expenditures and their administrative costs 













EU 28 countr. 17,7 15,2 7,6 5,4 
Euro area 12 count. 16,5 13,8 8,9 6,4 
Belgium 14,0 7,3 32,6 24,8 
Bulgaria 38,7 46,8 14,2 20,9 
Czechia 16,1 13,8 11,8 9,6 
Denmark 21,7 16,0 50,4 43,3 
Germany 24,4 23,6 26,3 25,5 
Estonia 27,4 29,3 70,8 73,4 
Ireland 18,5 10,7 28,8 20,3 
Greece -17,2 -14,7 -54,7 -53,3 
Spain 4,9 3,5 -12,7 -13,9 
France 21,3 16,4 7,8 3,5 
Croatia 5,6 10,2 -34,3 -31,5 
Italy 6,8 3,8 -12,2 -14,7 
Cyprus 7,0 -2,1 1,7 -6,9 
Latvia 27,4 42,8 2,8 15,3 
Lithuania 2,2 15,6 -2,2 10,6 
Luxembourg 35,4 10,9 25,6 3,0 
Hungary -7,5 -5,2 -21,4 -19,3 
Malta 41,4 23,7 38,1 20,8 
Netherlands 17,2 12,5 7,7 3,3 
Austria 13,7 7,6 -3,3 -8,5 
Poland 39,7 40,2 22,5 23,0 
Portugal 7,9 10,6 -30,2 -28,5 
Romania 27,1 33,2 95,0 104,4 
Slovenia 12,5 10,0 -15,5 -17,4 
Slovakia 27,6 26,2 4,0 2,9 
Finland 22,6 18,3 -31,7 -34,1 
Sweden 22,3 12,1 23,4 13,1 
United Kingdom 18,0 10,4 -41,3 -45,1 
Iceland 29,5 19,7 -23,1 -28,9 
Norway 32,2 19,5 9,4 -1,1 
Switzerland 35,7 22,8 40,8 27,4 
Serbia -5,1 -0,6 -30,3 -27,0 
Turkey 79,2 58,6 96,2 73,5 
Source: Eurostat, Social protection expenditure. 
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Such an increase (with some exceptions) is not uniform in different countries, 
which may indicate different efforts and reforms in the field of social security in 
depth and effectiveness. Compared with a smaller increase in administrative 
expenses, whose growth amounted to about 15% for the period 2008-2017, this 
difference is more likely to be characterized by improved SSA.  
Despite the differences in changes in total social security expenditures and 
administrative expenses, in the latter show a downward trend in most developed 
countries, on the contrary, a tendency to increase administrative expenses is 
typical for countries where social security systems are still under construction. 
If developed countries have already formed their social security systems and are 
already implementing reforms in the field of their administration, then developing 
countries need first of all the formation of their social security systems and 
relevant institutions. Based on this, we can conclude that not only the formal 
framework as such, but also the period and quality of SSA affect its effectiveness 
in each country. The same situation is characteristic in the pair between total 
expenses and administrative expenses per inhabitant. There are more volatile and 
different situations that characterize the various consequences of the reforms of 
different countries when adapting social security systems to changing conditions 
of society and the economy. Since we have received confirmation that institutions 
and approaches in SSA have a significant role, which can lead to lower 
administrative costs, at least, it is important to compare some characteristics of 
such institutions. 
3. Institutes and approaches in SSA: recent trends
To what extent social insurance is associated with the provision of social assistance, 
it is embedded in the tax and budget systems of the country, non-state providers are 
involved in the provision of social services, and representatives of trade unions and 
employer associations are involved in management – these and other issues determine 
the features of its administration institutions. The main tasks of SSA include, in our 
opinion, the following: (1) collection or accumulation of insurance premiums (social 
taxes); (2) investing funds; (3) performance of social functions: from the provision of 
social services to the calculation of insurance benefits; (4) financing SSA. To solve 
these and other tasks in the practice of SSA, different levels and institutions are used. 
Classically, the SSA is carried out at the state level with responsibility in the status of 
ministries: finance and social relations (labor). In addition, social insurance can be 
partially or fully managed by additional social and economic institutions (partners, 
providers), acting state and non-state structures. There are also structures reflecting 
the interests of social participants: employers and workers. An approximate 
classification of SSA institutions with the functions they perform is presented in the 
Table below (Table 2). The presence of identical functions performed by different 
institutions in SSA determines the variability of its administration. Moreover, the 
same functions can be performed simultaneously by different institutions, for 
example, for different types of social insurance, and in different forms: as cash 
payments or the provision of social services, for example, medical care. 
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Table 2. The relationship between functions and institutions of SSA 
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Source: authors. 
If we consider such administration in the initial order, from the receipt of 
contributions (insurance premiums, social taxes), then they are collected, as a rule, 
in two main forms: tax, financial or insurance. In the first case, administration of 
the contributions is carried out by the tax (financial, treasury) services of the 
country, in the second – through insurance institutions (funds, cash desks) of both 
state and non-state forms. One of the common examples of tax administration of 
collection of payments is the United States, where social contributions for wages 
are accumulated by the Internal Revenue Service as branches of the Ministry of 
Finance (or the State Treasury of the country) and then distributed to social 
security funds (for pension insurance, loss of breadwinner, disability) and medical 
funds. Such funds are managed by the Treasury Department, in which all receipts 
to the funds are recorded and assets are accumulated. The balance of SSA under 
the law is invested in the country's securities, the additional income from which 
forms the accumulation of such funds. Social insurance is administered by the 
state Social Security Agency. Insurance payments, for example, pensions  
(a number of federal benefits) are made by such an Agency through individual 
social accounts that each recipient of such payments has. Thus, the SSA in the 
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United States is closely integrated into the tax system of the country. Among the 
countries that have a similar tax- and centrally-oriented SSA with some additions, 
it should be noted Iceland, Hungary, Canada, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, 
Italy, Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Romania, Albania, Montenegro, Russia , 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, China. At the same time, 
many countries, such as Russia since 2017 or China since 2018, have changed the 
insurance administration to the tax administration.  
In Germany, there is another option for the SSA with the central responsibility of 
insurance organizations (providers). The insurance contributions of employers 
and workers for all types of social insurance are collected (accumulated) by 
medical insurance organizations (sickness funds), which then transfer funds to the 
following areas: providers of medical and nursing care, health care facilities (for 
health insurance and long-term care insurance); federal employment agency 
(unemployment insurance); state accident and health insurance providers; to 
federal pension insurance; to the artist insurance fund. That is, the central link in 
the administration of social insurance in Germany is the public or parastatal 
organizations that collect insurance contributions, and taxes are levied by the local 
tax authorities. At the same time, medical insurance companies (about 132 
organizations in 2014), which administer the collection of insurance premiums, 
form a national association with broad powers. Such administration through social 
insurance (security) institutions is present in Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Georgia, Lithuania, most republics of the former Soviet 
Union, as well as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, 
Uruguay. This is the so-called parallel option when tax and insurance administration 
of fees is carried out separately. 
There is also an alternative in the case of accumulative financing of pension 
insurance, an example of which is in countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Chile, 
El Salvador, Peru. Such funds, as a rule, accumulate contributions, manage 
investments and make payments. On the one hand, they are public institutions, but 
they also have much in common with private sector systems based on fund 
management (Barrand et al. 2004).  
Among the advantages of using tax agencies to collect social contributions are 
noted such as (1) synergies between organizations and their main functions; 
(2) possible reductions in administrative and regulatory requirements; (3) more 
efficient use of resources, reduction of administrative costs (infrastructure, IT 
labour costs), (4) improvement of intra-governmental coordination (Barrand et al. 
2004). At the same time, social insurance agencies in the form of insurance 
structures (funds, cash desks) are more targeted and focus on establishing 
individual rights to receive benefits and pay them to recipients. At the same time, 
there is some conflicting responsibility of such agencies for collecting 
(accumulating) insurance premiums and providing benefits to recipients of 
insurance payments (Rofman and Demarko 1999). 
The investment function in the SSA, its effectiveness is, in our opinion, one of the key 
reserves of its financial stability. The significance of investing in social funds is 
determined, firstly, by the expansion of individual accumulative and professional 
49 
(corporate) insurance programs as a result of the influence of demographic factors, in 
particular, for defined benefit plans, such investment requirements are unconditional. 
Secondly, unlike social support, which provides assistance in both monetary and 
non-monetary forms, social insurance, as a rule, provides for cash payments. In 
this connection, the cost of money is not only accumulated, but also paid, i.e. 
invested is important (Andersen 2012). Thirdly, social insurance funds are, in essence, 
a deferred part of employees' wages; these are, as a rule, compulsory savings made 
in order to receive ‘profitable’ payments in the future. At each moment of time, 
the balance in the individual retirement account belongs to the depositor as his 
personal ‘wealth’, even if he or she does not have the right to use it for purposes 
other than social security. This implies both the availability of these funds in 
absolute terms and their maximization, as well as long-term guarantees (Cichon 
et al. 2001). Fourth, social insurance funds are financial resources, in the monetary 
form of which the theoretical requirement of their investment and obtaining 
additional investment income has already been laid, and therefore the current 
deficit of such funds requires its placement in those types of assets that are in line 
with national interests. These and other reasons determine the accumulation by 
national social insurance systems of potentially significant amounts of money that 
are collected today to finance future obligations, especially in pension insurance. 
In this regard, questions arise of appropriate investment, financial planning, 
investment strategies, permitted types of assets, guarantees, i.e. generally 
appropriate investment policy. 
What institutions and approaches are common in the implementation of investment 
policies of social insurance and SSA? The investment functions of social insurance, 
reflected in Table 2, can be performed both by insurance structures (funds, cash 
registers) of state and non-state forms, and by financial and tax departments (services). 
Thus, institutions where the insurance fund is an independent organization with 
legislative (legal) powers and its own management service are present in Denmark, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and as 
insurance offices in Austria and Germany. In contrast, a contractual insurance fund 
consists of a separate pool of assets without legal personality and is managed by 
a separate financial organization: a bank, insurance or management company. The 
governing body of the fund is usually present as the board of directors of such 
a managing financial organization. Examples of contracted pension funds include 
Spain, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Portugal, Slovakia, Turkey, and open-ended 
funds in Italy and Poland. The third common form: trust funds have both institutional 
and contractual (contractual) characteristics. Trustees legally owning the assets of the 
funds transfer them to management in the interests of the participants (beneficiaries) 
of the investments. Although the function of trusts is similar to the function of funds, 
trustees are not a legally significant part of such trust (trust), while there is fiduciary 
responsibility of both managers and proxies. Examples of such funds are present  
in the USA, Great Britain, Australia, and Ireland (Stewart and Yermo 2008). Thus, in 
the implementation of the investment function in the administration of social 
insurance, the leading role is assigned not to a specific institution (as in the case of 
collection of insurance premiums), but rather to the format of investment 
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management, investment strategies, state regulation of investment activities of 
social insurance funds (Tessaromatis 2013; Stewart and Yermo 2008; Cichon 
2004; Tamagno 2001). 
The social service in the SSA is carried out by various state and non-state 
institutions, the question of attracting the latter to participate in such public 
administration can be considered a definite and confirmed practice. Nevertheless, 
the presence in recent years, in particular after the 2008 crisis, of a contradictory 
tendency: both to strengthen the state position in social services, and to expand 
the participation of non-state providers in it, determine the current significance of 
this issue. Arguments in favor of engaging non-governmental, private institutions 
in the provision of social services include arguments such as a more effective 
assessment of moral hazard risks and adverse selection, often over-insurance in 
case of unemployment and disability insurance (Koning 2006; Dixon 2002). On 
the other hand, public administration is less costly than the costs of private insurers 
and provides a more uniform and universal social service. The compromise between 
the extreme positions is to allow a mixed model of public service, using the 
advantages and limitations of state and non-state forms with the state (government) as 
a regulator (Galazoulas and Tsetoura 2014; Vonk 2010; Koning 2006). 
Despite the more extensive options for public or private components in the 
provision of public services, there are currently no reliable empirical studies on 
the effectiveness of using one or another component. In our opinion, the social 
insurance service, because of its economic and social significance, is state-
oriented both in terms of providing services and their control. Social service 
provides for significant investments in infrastructure, research with a rather 
uncertain outcome in the future that is not able to finance private institutional 
structures. The need to provide universal social insurance services also determines 
the activities of state providers. Another fundamental factor in the state-
centralized social service is the receipt and use of information on the cost, 
recipients, conditions of social services, which may be limited in the case of 
private providers (Cichon et al. 2004). 
In general, as with the implementation of the investment function of insurance, 
there are substitution effects: the absence of state social service entails its 
implementation by non-state market structures and, conversely, broad state social 
services reduce the participation of private providers (Andersen 2012). 
The administrative expenses for social security do not directly correlate with any 
model of the welfare state, but are generally higher, for example, for the Scandinavian 
countries, i.e. administering more social redistribution. On average, in OECD 
countries, administrative expenses for social insurance ranged from 1% to 4.5% 
of GDP in 2016 (Stefan 2015). However, there are non-linear (but correlated) 
relationship between the amount or ‘wealth’ of social expenditures and 
administration cost per inhabitant (Table 3). It is worth to note that the most 
‘expensive’ in administration are the countries with insurance-based financial 
approach in opposite to tax-based. 
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Table 3. The comparison of social security expenditures and their administrative 
costs per inhabitant in the EU countries, 2017, % 
Country Administrative 











Switzerland 6,0 Norway 18 763 
Netherlands 5,0 Luxembourg 18 685 
Ireland 4,3 Switzerland 16 511 
Denmark 3,9 Denmark 15 338 
France 3,8 Sweden 12 428 
Germany 3,7 Netherlands 11 739 
Belgium 3,7 Finland 11 248 
Czechia 2,9 France 11 154 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 2,7 Austria 10 727 
Lithuania 2,7 Germany  10 716 
Slovakia 2,6 Belgium 10 071 
Poland 2,3 Iceland 8 940 
Italy 2,0 
United 
Kingdom 8 687 
Sweden 2,0 Ireland 8 660 
Romania 2,0 Italy 7 765 
Bulgaria 1,9 Spain 5 440 
Austria 1,8 Slovenia 4 467 
Turkey 1,8 Greece 4 438 
Norway 1,7 Portugal 4 394 
Serbia 1,7 Cyprus 4 279 
Spain 1,7 Malta 3 525 
Finland 1,7 Czechia 3 178 
Croatia 1,6 Slovakia 2 564 
Hungary 1,6 Poland 2 419 
Estonia 1,6 Croatia 2 392 
Slovenia 1,5 Estonia 2 383 
Latvia 1,4 Hungary 2 230 
Luxembourg 1,4 Lithuania 1 973 
Portugal 1,3 Latvia 1 765 
Cyprus 1,3 Turkey 1 420 
Malta 1,1 Romania 1 239 
Greece 0,9 Bulgaria 1 121 





Source: Eurostat, Social protection expenditure. 
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4. Conclusions
The variability of social security institutions and their forms determine both the 
complexity of the administration process and its mixed forms. Despite the 
trajectories of the institutional environment in the SSA and social insurance, the 
state remains in the role of the main guarantor of the standards of social services, 
social policy in general. On the whole, different administrative structures provide 
different purposes, state control, redistribution, and intermediation. Since the SSA 
has additional potential for improving of social security and social insurance, 
thanks to its use it is possible to make guarantees, benefits, and services more 
efficient and provide better quality for citizens. This article is one of the first 
attempts to focus on recent trends in the SSA with its role as a reserve in social 
sustainability; promising research in this area may be associated with a quantitative 
assessment of the relationship between different forms of administration and the 
resulting achievements for social security. 
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